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Searching for the New Normal: The Rebuilding Process for Risk 
Management—A conference summary
by Carl R. Tannenbaum, senior vice president, Supervision and Regulation, and Steven VanBever, lead supervision analyst,  
Supervision and Regulation
The Chicago Fed’s Supervision and Regulation Department, in conjunction with DePaul 
University’s Center for Financial Services, sponsored its third annual Financial Institution 
Risk Management Conference on April 6–7, 2010. The conference concentrated on 
comprehensive risk management, lessons learned, and headline issues.
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crisis.­He­first­provided­an­overview­of­The “new normal” will include more effective chief risk officers, 
better use of financial models, improved capital planning, and 
























































































































































Vice President and Director of Research; Douglas­D.­Evanoff,­
Vice President,­financial studies; Jonas­D.­M.­Fisher,­
Vice President, macroeconomic policy research; Daniel­
Aaronson, Vice President, microeconomic policy research; 
William­A.­Testa,­Vice President, regional programs, and 
Economics Editor; Helen­O’D.­Koshy and­Han­Y.­Choi,­
Editors;­Rita­Molloy­and­Julia­Baker,­Production 
Editors;­Sheila­A.­Mangler,­Editorial Assistant.
Chicago Fed Letter­is­published­by­the­Economic­
Research­Department­of­the­Federal­Reserve­Bank­
of­Chicago.­The­views­expressed­are­the­authors’­
and­do­not­necessarily­reflect­the­views­of­the­
Federal­Reserve­Bank­of­Chicago­or­the­Federal­
Reserve­System.­
©­2010­Federal­Reserve­Bank­of­Chicago­­
Chicago Fed Letter­articles­may­be­reproduced­in­
whole­or­in­part,­provided­the­articles­are­not­­
reproduced­or­distributed­for­commercial­gain­
and­provided­the­source­is­appropriately­credited.­
Prior­written­permission­must­be­obtained­for­
any­other­reproduction,­distribution,­republica-
tion,­or­creation­of­derivative­works­of­Chicago Fed 
Letter­articles.­To­request­permission,­please­contact­
Helen­Koshy,­senior­editor,­at­312-322-5830­or­
email­Helen.Koshy@chi.frb.org.­Chicago Fed 
Letter and­other­Bank­publications­are­available
at­www.chicagofed.org.
­­
ISSN­0895-0164
the­key­points­in­the­banking­regulatory­
agencies’­guidance­on­prudent­CRE­loan­
workouts.2­This­guidance­emphasizes­
that­excessive­foreclosures­are­in­no­one’s­
best­interest­and­that­loans­should­not­
be­adversely­classified­solely­because­the­
value­of­collateral­has­declined.­Overall,­
better­estimation­of­CRE­losses­would­
have­improved­the­adequacy­of­loan-loss­
reserves­and­capital­at­banks­with­high­
CRE­concentrations­and­reduced­the­
severity­of­the­current­banking­crisis.
Financial modeling
Many­have­identified­failures­of­(and­in-
appropriate­use­of)­financial­models­as­
among­the­key­causes­of­the­financial­
crisis.­Tannenbaum­examined­the­
strengths­and­weaknesses­of­modeling­
with­a­panel­composed­of­William­H.­
Schomburg­III,­State­Street­Corporation;­
Michael­Alix,­Federal­Reserve­Bank­­
of­New­York;­and­Deborah­J.­Lucas,­
Congressional­Budget­Office.­
Schomburg­said­that­models­provide­an­
analytic­framework­to­assess­risks­and­a­
common­language­to­communicate­these­
risks­to­others.­To­provide­the­necessary­
controls­over­models,­State­Street­uses­
a­highly­structured­four-level­approach,­
comprising­the­model­owners,­validation­
and­assessment­groups,­and­a­high-level­
risk-management­committee­with­final­
responsibility.­Schomburg­emphasized­
that­modeling­needs­to­be­supplemented­
with­stress­tests­and­expert­judgment.­
However,­a­common­weakness­of­model-
ing,­stress­tests,­and­expert­judgment­is­
a­bias­toward­recent­data.3
Alix­provided­a­supervisory­perspective.­
He­stressed­the­need­to­understand­the­
purpose­of­a­particular­model­before­try-
ing­to­determine­its­effectiveness.­In­his­
view,­one­commonly­perceived­problem­
with­risk­models—that­they­don’t­produce­
sufficiently­distressed­results—is­attrib-
utable­not­to­technical­shortcomings­but­
rather­to­the­inability­of­users­to­“think­
outside­the­box”­(i.e.,­to­consider­plausi-
ble,­but­never­experienced,­shock­sce-
narios).­Other­problems­are­the­lack­
of­reliability­of­input­data­and­the­un-
critical­use­of­models’­output.
Lucas­was­not­convinced­that­models­
themselves­had­failed­during­the­recent­
crisis.­However,­there­were­clearly­short-
comings­in­the­implementation­and­use­
of­models.­It­will­be­relatively­easy­to­cor-
rect­some­of­the­technical­problems­of­
models­and­to­use­data­that­cover­at­least­
an­entire­deep­business­cycle.­But­it­will­
be­harder­to­model­tail­events,­to­effec-
tively­use­the­information­that­models­
provide,­and­to­change­the­culture­of­how­
models­are­used.­Specifically,­decision-
makers­need­to­better­understand­models,­
to­integrate­analysis­and­judgment­more,­
and­to­use­models­to­inform­decision-
making­(not­only­justify­decisions­already­
made),­said­Lucas.
Capital planning
In­light­of­the­large­number­of­financial­
institutions­whose­capital­proved­inad-
equate­during­the­financial­crisis,­inter-
nal­capital­planning­has­become­a­key­
focus­of­bank­supervision.­It­was­the­
subject­of­a­panel­moderated­by­Andre­
Reynolds,­Federal­Reserve­Bank­of­
Chicago.­This­panel­featured­Tanya­K.­
Smith,­Office­of­the­Comptroller­of­the­
Currency;­Ron­Feldman,­Federal­Reserve­
Bank­of­Minneapolis;­and­Joseph­R.­
Mason,­Louisiana­State­University.
Smith­outlined­the­“new­normal”­for­cap-
ital­planning.­Capital­planning­encom-
passes­identification­of­risks­and­risk­
tolerance,­risk­measurement,­goal­set-
ting­(for­risks­and­capital),­analysis­of­
capital­supply­and­demand,­assessment­
of­a­range­of­operating­requirements,­
and­development­of­capital­contingency­
plans.­All­of­these­must­be­incorporated­
into­a­sound­governance­framework.­The­
end­result­of­capital­planning­should­not­
be­just­a­single­number.­Instead,­such­plan-
ning­should­constitute­a­well-articulated,­
well-supported,­and­well-understood­
process­surrounding­the­many­facets­
of­capital­and­risk.
Feldman­considered­capital­in­relation­
to­the­too-big-to-fail­(TBTF)­problem.­
TBTF­refers­to­the­provision­of­discre-
tionary­government­support­to­the­un-
insured­creditors­of­financial­institutions­
perceived­to­pose­systemic­risk.­He­
compared­two­options­for­addressing­
TBTF—a­capital­surcharge­for­systemically­
important­institutions­and­a­premium­
(e.g.,­incorporated­into­deposit-insurance­
premiums)­that­charges­systemically­
important­firms­for­the­implied­govern-
ment­support­they­receive.­He­concluded­
that­a­premium­is­superior­because­it­is­
likely­to­1)­more­efficiently­and­effectively­
discourage­excessive­risk-taking­by­finan-
cial­institutions­and­2)­more­transparently­
address­the­TBTF­problem.
Finally,­Mason­applied­a­circular­five-step­
risk-management­cycle­(develop­goals,­
identify/quantify­exposures,­define­
philosophy,­implement­program,­and­
evaluate­and­control)­to­a­wide­range­of­
historical­risk­scenarios,­both­financial­
and­nonfinancial.­Failure­to­adhere­to­
the­cycle­can­lead­to­large­unexpected­
losses,­as­in­the­case­of­Barings­Bank­in­
1995­or­Société­Générale­in­2008.
Risk and compensation
Alteration­of­incentive­compensation­prac-
tices­is­also­high­on­the­reform­agenda.­
Keith­M.­Howe,­DePaul­University,­led­
a­panel­on­risk­and­compensation­that­
featured­Steven­N.­Kaplan,­University­of­
Chicago;­Kevin­J.­Murphy,­University­of­
Southern­California;­and­James­W.­­
Nelson,­Federal­Reserve­Bank­of­Chicago.­
Kaplan­sought­to­determine­whether­
poorly­designed­top­executive­compen-
sation­at­financial­firms­had­fueled­the­
financial­crisis.­If­this­had­been­the­case,­
we­would­have­expected­to­find­that­top­
bank­executives­were­rewarded­for­1­Technically,­tail­risk­is­a­form­of­portfolio­
risk­that­arises­when­the­possibility­that­an­
investment­will­move­more­than­three­stan-
dard­deviations­from­the­mean­is­greater­
than­what­is­shown­by­a­normal­distribution.­
More­broadly,­the­term­is­used­to­refer­to­
the­risk­of­large­unexpected­losses­for­the­
financial­sector­as­a­whole.
2­For­further­details,­see­the­Federal­Reserve­
press­release­on­prudent­CRE­loan­workouts­
at­www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/
press/bcreg/20091030a.htm.
3­Financial­models­often­use­recent­data­that­
do­not­cover­past­business­cycles.­For­ex-
ample,­during­the­late­2000s,­data­from­only­
the­preceding­few­years­would­not­have­
included­any­instances­of­sharp­declines­in­
asset­values­and­thus­would­have­produced­
overly­optimistic­modeling­results.
4­ See­the­Federal­Reserve­press­release­at­
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/
press/bcreg/20091022a.htm.
short-term­results­with­large­amounts­of­
upfront­cash­pay;­bank­executives­did­
not­hold­sufficiently­large­amounts­of­
stock­to­align­their­interests­with­those­
of­shareholders;­and­firms­utilizing­more­
short-term­pay­and­less­stock­ownership­
as­compensation­performed­worse­in­the­
crisis.­Recent­research­that­Kaplan­cited­
did­not­support­these­propositions.­
Therefore,­poorly­designed­top­execu-
tive­compensation­does­not­appear­to­
have­played­a­significant­role­in­the­
financial­crisis,­especially­compared­with­
other­factors.­Kaplan­argued­that­more­
regulation­of­top­bank-executive­pay­is­
unnecessary­and­would­have­negative­
unintended­consequences,­such­as­driv-
ing­the­most­talented­employees­to­un-
regulated­sectors,­such­as­hedge­funds,­
private­equity­funds,­and­boutique­firms.­
Murphy­was­also­pessimistic­about­in-
creased­government­regulation­of­com-
pensation.­He­said­that­regulation­is­
often­designed­to­be­punitive­and­ad-
vance­political­agendas­rather­than­to­be­
constructive­and­foster­creation­of­share-
holder­value.­Nevertheless,­Murphy­
argued­that­compensation­practices­in­
financial­services­could­be­improved.­
He­suggested­bonus­deferrals­and­
“clawback”­provisions­(where­rewards­
are­recovered­if­critical­indicators­on­
which­bonuses­were­based­are­revised­
in­the­future).­He­also­recommended­
basing­bonuses­on­value­creation­rather­
than­on­sheer­volume­of­transactions.
Nelson­presented­the­Federal­Reserve’s­
proposed­guidance­on­sound­incentive­
compensation­policies.4­This­guidance­
is­based­on­three­fundamental­principles.­
First,­incentive­compensation­arrange-
ments­should­not­provide­employees­
with­incentives­to­take­risks­beyond­an­
organization’s­ability­to­effectively­iden-
tify­and­manage­those­risks.­Second,­such­
arrangements­should­be­compatible­with­
effective­risk­management­and­controls.­
Third,­these­policies­should­be­sup-
ported­by­strong­corporate­governance,­
including­active­and­effective­board­
oversight.­This­proposed­guidance­is­
being­supplemented­by­two­supervisory­
initiatives—one­for­large,­complex­
banking­organizations­and­another­for­
the­remaining­organizations.
Summing up
Eugene­A.­Ludwig,­Promontory­Financial­
Group,­was­the­U.S.­Comptroller­of­the­
Currency­over­the­period­1993–98.­He­
indicated­that­the­“new­normal”­will­in-
corporate­stronger,­fortress-like­balance­
sheets­and­more­effective­chief­risk­offi-
cers­and­boards.­While­many­of­the­firms­
that­became­troubled­did­have­chief­risk­
officers­that­were­formally­independent­
of­business­line­management,­often­
these­individuals­lacked­sufficient­in-
fluence­to­restrain­excessive­risk-taking.­
For­chief­risk­officers­to­gain­more­in-
fluence,­Ludwig­supported­producing­
targeted,­high-quality­risk­reporting­to­
boards­rather­than­generating­a­massive­
tome­(known­in­one­firm­as­“the­brick”)­
that­nobody­reads.­In­addition,­risk-
management­models­should­place­more­
emphasis­on­tail­events,­become­more­
forward-looking,­and­draw­on­real-time,­
enterprise-wide­data.­
For­Ludwig,­concentration­levels­in­
CRE­at­small­and­mid-sized­banks­were­
less­of­a­problem­than­their­business­
models­that­ignored­other­types­of­
lending­opportunities,­such­as­business­
lending.­Ludwig­also­recommended­
that­banks­improve­the­quality­and­di-
versity­of­their­earnings­by­emphasizing­
deposit­accounts,­developing­sustain-
able­fee­income,­and­looking­hard­for­
cost-saving­opportunities.